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Abstract
The world is urgently looking for ways to flatten the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) curve, and many governments 
have resorted to implementing strict lockdowns, as researchers show the effectiveness of China’s approaches in 
containing the virus. However, this paper argues that the draconian lockdowns instituted in Wuhan, Hubei, China, may 
have actually contributed to intensifying patient surges and incapacitating local health systems. Medical aids were rushed 
to Hubei and new hospitals were rapidly built, however, the healthcare system was still unable to match the staggering 
increase of patients in the early stages of the lockdowns. The paper proposes using patient evacuation to enhance 
sustainable COVID-19 mitigation during lockdowns. It demonstrates that patients in Hubei could have been transported 
to other Chinese provinces where hospitals were under-utilized. This could have theoretically saved thousands of lives by 
reducing inequities between Hubei and the rest of China in healthcare capacity for treating COVID-19 patients. 
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Introduction
China’s effective control of coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) has largely been attributed to the draconian 
lockdowns and travel restrictions instituted nationwide.1-3 
Amid increasing large-scale lockdowns around the world, 
current literature debates whether other countries should, 
or will even be able to, follow China’s example to flatten the 
coronavirus curve.3,4 China’s lockdowns started in Wuhan on 
January 23, 2020, and quickly expanded to the entire Hubei 
province and other provinces. By April 8, 2020, 78 days 
later, Wuhan lockdowns were mostly lifted, weeks after the 
coronavirus had been largely brought under control. It is time 
to look back and draw lessons from the Chinese experience 
that may benefit current and future pandemic control. While 
many have examined China’s COVID-19 mitigation, none 
have done so from a sustainability perspective. This paper 
explores sustainable COVID-19 mitigation with attention to 
health inequities associated with lockdowns in Wuhan and 
Hubei and the possible benefits of patient transport, in the 
context of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda.5
Methods
The UN 2030 Agenda provides guidance for countries to 
achieve Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030.5 
Interconnected and interdependent, many of the 17 SDGs are 
directly or indirectly related to health policy and management. 
In particular, SDG 3 is to “ensure healthy lives and promote 
well-being for all.” Accordingly, this paper defines sustainable 
COVID-19 mitigation as measures that ensure healthy lives 
and promote well-being for everyone and contribute to 
the development of sustainable, inclusive societies. Health 
inequities refer to unfair and avoidable differences in 
health or healthcare resources caused by poor governance.6 
The words evacuation, transport, and relocation are used 
interchangeably in the paper to refer to long-distance move 
of patients by medical professionals from home to a receiving 
hospital following established procedures for patient safety 
and infection control. COVID-19 case and death data were 
derived from daily reports by Sina.com, which are based on 
daily reports by the National Health Commission of China 
and Health Commissions in all China’s 31 provincial level 
units. The data refer to confirmed cases, those that were 
tested positive and with symptoms. Fatality refers to percent 
of deaths among confirmed cases of COVID-19.
Healthcare System Capacity Overwhelmed: Lockdowns 
Led to Health Inequities and Worsened the Outbreaks in 
Wuhan and Hubei
As of April 24, 2020, China had reported 82 804 cases of 
COVID-19 with 4632 deaths.7 Hubei province and its capital 
city Wuhan bore the majority of the burden (Table). Case 
fatality in Wuhan and Hubei are several times higher than in 
the rest of China. Based on the 2018 population, published 
in 2019 by the Statistical Bureau of China, infection rate in 
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Hubei was over 68 times higher than that in its six neighbors 
(Human, Jiangxi, Anhui, Henan, Shaanxi, and Chongqing), 
while the death rate was over 631 times higher. These rates 
are undoubtedly on the lower end of the estimate, given 
the number of unconfirmed COVID-19 patients who died 
outside hospitals and might not have been fully accounted for 
in the official statistics in Hubei.8
The main cause of these shocking geographical disparities 
in COVID-19 outcomes is that Wuhan and Hubei shouldered 
the outbreaks with a fraction of the nation’s medical resources 
(Table). Wuhan had just two infectious diseases hospitals with 
1399 beds. Although general hospitals were hastily converted, 
new hospitals were constructed to counter the patient surges, 
and materials, equipment, and medical workers were rushed 
into Wuhan, it was impossible to meet the rising demand.7,13 
The lockdowns initially caused public panic and resulted 
in many cross-infections at the crowded, overwhelmed 
hospitals.8 Furthermore, the virus spread quickly at poorly-
prepared hospitals, infecting a large number of exhausted 
healthcare workers.8 Of the 3416 COVID-19 cases among 
medical workers nationwide, who had received donations by 
April 24, 2020, 83% were in Wuhan and 99% in Hubei (Table). 
Two weeks after the lockdown on January 23, 2020, there 
was still a severe shortage of hospital beds for COVID-19 
patients.14 As the lockdowns prevented patients from seeking 
care elsewhere, health inequities were created.
Healthcare inequities also occurred between COVID-19 
and other patients. There was already a shortage of hospital 
beds before the outbreak in Wuhan. In the first few weeks of 
the lockdowns, nearly all medical resources were devoted to 
COVID-19 control. Patients with other diseases, including 
children and the elderly, were sent home so that more resources 
could be directed to fighting the virus.8,14 Some seriously ill 
patients were unable to go back to the hospital for months 
due to shortage of healthcare for non-COVID-19 treatment.15 
Thus, the health and well-being of these patients was unfairly 
endangered. Furthermore, the nationwide lockdowns 
reinforced xenophobia and locational discrimination as 
neighbors guarded against neighbors. Anyone crossing the 
city or provincial borders was automatically a suspected 
COVID-19 carrier and subjected to extensive quarantine. 
Hubei residents continue to face discrimination today when 
they return to their employment in other provinces.
Patient Relocation Could Have Reduced Health Inequities 
and Saved Lives
The Hubei lockdowns effectively helped other provinces 
control the spread of COVID-19, as it has been reported.1-3 
However, when the healthcare system was incapacitated 
in Hubei, officials should have begun evacuating patients, 
particularly those with severe cases. In addition, it would have 
been faster to move patients out of Hubei, rather than move 
resources into Hubei and build new hospitals. Healthcare 
workers from outside Hubei would have worked more 
efficiently at their home hospitals, where they could be closer 
to their loved ones, than those in Hubei. 
While they were vastly overwhelmed in Hubei, hospitals 
were in general well below capacity and under-utilized in 
the rest of China. Outside Hubei, hospital beds tended to 
be reserved for potential COVID-19 patients during the 
outbreak and thus were unavailable to most regular patients, 
except for emergencies. This was probably an overreaction 
as there were relatively few COVID-19 cases outside Hubei 
(Table). For example, Hubei’s neighbors Jiangxi had 936 total 
accumulated cases with one death and Shaanxi had 253 cases 
with three deaths, as of March 26, 2020.7 Outside Hubei, only 
four provinces had cases over 1000, from 1018 in Hunan to 
1448 in Guangdong. Total cases were 640 in Jiangsu with 
no death, 566 in Beijing, and 468 in Shanghai.7 This means 
that there were many hospital beds left empty outside Hubei, 
beds that could have accommodated patients from Hubei. In 
fact, 96% of the total infectious disease hospital beds were 
in the rest of China, which could have been adequate for 
accommodating all COVID-19 patients in the country, had 
they been made available (Table).
It is unknown exactly to what extent patient relocation 
could have helped save lives, because it was never attempted. 
However, hypothetical scenarios are proposed here to imitate 
possible outcomes (Figure). Figure A illustrates what happened 
in Hubei when the healthcare system was incapacitated, 
before outside aids came to the rescue afterward. Figure B 
hypothesizes that patient evacuation would have reduced 
both cases and deaths markedly when the healthcare system 
outside Hubei was operating under capacity and would have 
been able to treat patients transported there. The assumption 
is that cases and deaths would both decline if hospitals were 
capable of evaluating and caring for patients, preventing those 
Table. Total Accumulated Confirmed COVID-19 Cases and Deaths as of April 24, 20207 Versus Medical Resources Before the Outbreak9,10 by Location, China






















Wuhan 50 333 (60.79) 3869 (83.53) 7.69 569.55 437.80 2825 (82.80) 1399a (1.06) 78.5 (4.95) 94 (2.38)
Hubei 68 128 (82.28) 4512 (97.41) 6.62 115.14 76.25 3373 (98.86) 4629 (3.52) 95 (6.00) 179 (4.51)
Hubei’s 6 
neighbors 5801 (7.01) 42 (0.91) 0.72 1.68 0.12 4 (0.12) 27 806 (21.12) 424 (26.77) 858 (21.65)
Outside Hubei 14 676 (17.72) 120 (2.59) 0.82 1.48 0.12 39 (1.14) 127 026 (96.48) 1489 (94.00) 3786 (95.49)
Abbreviation: COVID-19, coronavirus disease 2019.
a These are total beds in the two infectious diseases hospitals in Wuhan.12 This could be an underestimate as additional beds might exist in some other hospitals.
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patients from leaving the hospital and continuing to infect 
others. It is also assumed that timely patient treatment would 
reduce cases and deaths, and thus allow the outbreak to be 
taken under control sooner than it was.
Furthermore, it can be surmised that relocated patients 
would have faced fatality rates similar to those outside Hubei. 
Assuming no case reduction but just fatalities ranging from 
one to three times as that outside Hubei at 0.82%, from 2836 
to 3953 lives in Hubei (2097 to 3456 in Wuhan) would have 
been saved (Figure C). Consequently, deaths would have been 
reduced by at least 63% and up to even 88% in Hubei (68% 
to 89% in Wuhan). That is, there was a possibility that nearly 
90% of the deaths in Wuhan would have been avoided in the 
most optimistic scenario. If case reduction were taken into 
consideration, the outcomes would be even better. Patient 
relocation would have also helped to ensure healthy lives and 
promote well-being for non-COVID-19 patients in Hubei as 
they would have been able to receive essential medical care. It 
would have been a more sustainable way to flatten the curve.
Looking Ahead
Debates over the lockdowns in China have focused on their 
effectiveness in containing the spread of the virus. This paper 
goes one step further to examine their impacts on fatality 
and health inequities and proposes patient relocation as an 
additional way for mitigation. It is unclear why China did not 
resort to patient evacuation during the crisis, as the highly 
centralized government had both the authority and transport 
ability to do so. It is understandable that such a large-scale 
relocation would have been unprecedented and controversial, 
due to fear of increased risk of infection in receiving areas. 
However, COVID-19 patients were securely moved around 
within Wuhan (eg, inter-hospital transfers). Safe inter-
provincial transport should have been feasible. Many 
countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and India, evacuated their nationals from Hubei in February 
2020. Later on, China evacuated its nationals from Iran 
and Britain. Some of the evacuees carried the virus or were 
suspected to. However, the evacuations were considered safe 
and there are no reports of increased exposure from evacuees. 
Furthermore, small-scale evacuations of COVID-19 patients 
have been conducted in the European Union. For example, 
French and Italian patients have been moved to Germany and 
Switzerland for treatment.16 There are no known reports of 
increased infections from these evacuees either. Had it wanted 
to, China should have been able to safely relocate patients out 
of Hubei while minimizing additional infections. Yet, the 
most likely explanation is that China was simply following 
the conventional infectious disease mitigation playbook that 
focuses on spatially containing disease transmission.2,17 Patient 
transport, as a way to flatten the curve, would have been 
more effective than sending medical aids to Wuhan in terms 
of efficiency in resource allocation and saving lives, though 
China could have used a combination of both methods. The 
goal of patient evacuation is to save as many lives as possible 
by sharing all available healthcare resources. Cities, provinces/
states, and even countries may not be adequately prepared 
for the current COVID-19 or future similar pandemics. The 
world must form greater alliances and consider unprecedented 
solutions to manage such emergencies in a more sustainable, 
inclusive way. As has happened among European countries,16 
patient relocation may also promote better understanding, 
friendship, and solidarity among places involved, which, in 
turn, will contribute to healthy living and well-being for all.
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